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Securities delivered to the trustee under provisions of a will included stock in the
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corporate trustee and in a bank. Subsequently, the bank and the trust company
affiliated, under an agreement whereby the bank acquired substantially all the
stock of the trust company, to be held for the benefit of the shareholders of the
bank. The holders of the trust stock and the old bank stock exchanged their shares
for new stock in the bank. The trust authorized the trustee to retain stocks in the
trust estate, to invest in securities other than of the character prescribed by law
for trust investments, and to participate in the reorganization of corporations in
which the testator held stock. Trustees brought a bill in equity for instructions
relative to the will. Held, the corporate trustee was precluded by the "undivided
loyalty" rule from acquiring stock created by the affiliation in exchange for stock
held by the testator in the trust company and in the bank. City Bank Farmers
Trust Co. 11. Taylor, CR.I. 1949) 69 A. (2d) 234.
One of the primary duties of a trustee in the administration of a trust is the
duty of loyalty. 1 This duty is imposed upon the trustee because of the fiduciary
relationship arising from the creation of a trust.2 The trustee must administer the
trust solely for the advantage of the beneficiaries, and he is not allowed to place
himself in such a position that his own interests would conffict with those of the
beneficiaries. A corporate trustee is subject to this same duty of loyalty,3 and the
court here is concerned with the extent to which the loyalty rule should be applied. Confficts of interest may range from those whi~h are direct and substantial
to the borderline cases where _any conffict of interest is remote and unsubstantial.
However, if the strict rule, as laid down by Cardozo in Meinhard 11. Salmon,4 is
adhered to, any.possible conffict of in,terest, no matter how remote, will amount to
a breach of duty on the part of the trustee. The courts appear to be applying the
"undivided loyalty" rule strictly. Because of this duty, it is held that a corporate
trustee can neither purchase its own shares nor retain them in the trust estate.5
The courts point out a conffict of interests in that it may be to the advantage of
the beneficiaries to sell stock when the market is falling, while it will be to the
advantage of the corporate trustee to retain its own shares to prevent the further
depression of the market. 6 However, it has 1;,een suggested that any possible
conffict of interest here is very remote; the corporation itself is not usually concerned
with the market price or ownership of its shares.7 The logical extension of this
rule, against retention of its own shares by a corporate trustee, appeared in the
New York case of Ci_ty Bank Farmers Trust Co. 11. Cannon,8 which involved the
same affiliation as in this case. The New York court said that the acquisition of a
beneficial interest in its own stock by a corporate trustee would result in a conffict
lBoGBRT, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §99 (1942); 2 ScOTT, TRUSTS §170 (1939).
2 Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928), is the leading case discuss•
mg the loyalty duty of fiduciaries.
.
32 ScOTT, TRUSTS §§170.11, 170.13, 170.15 (1939); 39 CoL. L. Rllv. 528 (1939).
4 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928).
Ii Matter of Durston's Will, 297 N.Y. 64, 74 N.E. (2d) 310 (1947); In re Trusteeship
of Stone, 138 Ohio St. 293, 34 N.E. (2d) 755 (1941).
6 People by Kernerv. Canton National Bank, 288 ill. App. 418, 6 N.E. (2d) 220 (1937).
7Niles and.Schwartz, "Breach of Trust-Recent Developments," 20 N.Y. UNIV. L.Q.
165 (1944). ·
s 291 N.Y. 125, 51 N.E. (2d) 674 (1943).
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of interests. And, in strong dictum, it indicated that the duty of loyalty would be
breached if the corporate trustee acquired new shares of the bank in exchange.for
old, after the affiliation in which the bank acquired almost all the stock of the
trust company. However, it was held that the trustee was not liable on the ground
that the beneficiaries were barred by the consent of the settlor, who had a power
to revoke the trust, to the acts of the trustee. Although at least one authority seems
to favor this decision and its implications,0 there is a strong argument, in opposi,
tion, that the New York court was pressing the principle of "undivided loyalty"
too far and imposing unnecessary hardship on the trustee.10 The Taylor case is
merely an application of the dictum of the Cannon case, an acceptance of the strict
loyalty rule laid down there. However, there are added factors which distinguish
this case from the Cannon case. Here the trustee received some of its own shares
as part of the trust estate,11 and the testator may have given the trustee power to
retain its own stock; the court did not decide this question, assuming that the facts
here were identical with those in the Cannon case. It is generally agreed that a
settlor may waive the benefit of the loyalty rule and allow a corporate trustee to
purchase or retain its own shares.12 Just when this has been done is a matter of
interpretation of the trust instrument.13 And, several courts have held that where
a corporate trustee is authorized to retain its own stock, it may also hold new stock
issued in reorganization.14 Therefore, in this case, if the testator had authorized
the retention of the shares of the corporate trustee in the trust estate, the trustee
should have been permitted to hold the new stock acquired in exchange for its own
shares, even if the authorization could not be construed to permit the trustee to
retain those new shares acquired in exchange for the bank stock held by the
testator.
Nancy J. Ringland

·o Scott, ''Retention of Its Own Shares by a Corporate Trustee," 57 HARv. L. REv. 601
(1944).
10 Nils and Schwartz, "Breach of Trust-Recent Developments," 20 N.Y. Umv. L.Q.
REv. 165 (1944).
·
11 Statutes may permit the trustee to continue investments made by the testator. Cal.
Gen. Laws (Deering, Supp. 1944) Act 652, §105; 13 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1949)
§111(6); 41 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1949) §21(6). Held not applicable in case
of corporate trustee holding its own stock, People v. Canton National Bank, 288 ill. App.
418-, 6 N.E. (2d) 220 (1937). Contra: In re Riker, 124 N.J. Eq. 228, 1 A. (2d) 213 (1938).
12 Matter of Balfe, 245 App. Div. 22, 280 N.Y.S. 128 (1935); In re Easton's Estate, 178
Misc. 611, 35 N.Y.S. (2d) 546 (1942); Matter of Roche, 233 App. Div. 236, 251 N.Y.S.
347 (1931).
.
.
13 "Clauses enlarging the trustee's investment powers are strictly construed." 3 BocBRT,
TausTs AND TnusTBBs §683 at 377 (1935).
14 In re Riker, supra, note 11; Robison v. Elston Bank & Trust Co., 113 Ind. App. 633,
48 N.E. (2d) 181, 49 N.E. (2d) 348 (1943); In re Dimond, 37 Ohio Abs. 248, 46 N.E.
(2d) 788 (1942); In re Greenawalt's Estate, 343 Pa. 413, 21 A. (2d) 890 (1941).

